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The Supreme Court’s Open-Ended Protection
Against Third-Party Retaliation
Jessica K. Fink*
For many years, federal courts have struggled with whether to
recognize claims of “third-party retaliation” under Title VII of the Civil
1
Rights Act of 1964. Third-party retaliation claims arise when one
employee engages in some activity protected under Title VII and the
employer takes adverse action not against that employee but rather
against another employee with whom the original worker has some
relationship. For example, an employee might file a discrimination
charge against her employer and the employer might retaliate against the
employee’s husband, who works for the same employer. Or, an employee
might participate in a workplace discrimination investigation and the
employer might demote the employee’s sibling, who works for the same
employer.
Until quite recently, the federal courts were split regarding the
extent to which they should recognize these claims as falling within Title
VII’s prohibitions. Some of the confusion regarding the viability of the
third-party retaliation doctrine stemmed from the language of Title VII

* Associate Professor, California Western School of Law; J.D., 2001, Harvard Law School;
B.A., 1997, University of Michigan. This Essay is based upon a lengthier piece forthcoming in the
Hastings Law Journal. See Jessica Fink, Protected by Association? The Supreme Court’s Incomplete
Approach to Defining the Scope of the Third-Party Retaliation Doctrine, 63 Hastings L.J. (forthcoming
January 2012).
Preferred citation for this Essay: Jessica K. Fink, The Supreme Court’s Open-Ended Protection Against
Third-Party Retaliation, 2011 Hastings L.J. Voir Dire 7.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to -17 (2006 & Supp. 2009) (“Title VII”), amended by Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072–74 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a
(2006)).
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itself. By its very terms, Title VII bars employers from “retaliating”
against employees who have engaged in activities protected under Title
VII. However, the anti-retaliation language within Title VII seems to bar
only “direct” retaliation by employers. Specifically, Section 704 of Title
VII states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for
employment . . . because he has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
2
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.

Many courts previously interpreted this language—particularly the
term “he” within this provision—to mean that the individual subject to
adverse action from an employer must be the same person who engaged
3
in some protected activity. As one court observed, “it is hard to imagine
a clearer way of specifying that the individual who was discriminated
4
against must also be the individual who engaged in protected activity.”
While some courts acknowledged that this narrow reading of Section 704
could stymie the ability of certain plaintiffs to seek relief in the wake of
5
indirect retaliation by their employers, these courts felt constrained by
what they saw as Congress’s stated intent with respect to the scope of this
6
statutory provision. Thus, until recently, every federal court to rule on

2. See id. § 2000e-3(a) (emphasis added).
3. See Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813, 819 (8th Cir. 1998) (“We believe that the
rule . . . that a plaintiff bringing a retaliation claim need not have personally engaged in statutorily
protected activity if his or her spouse or significant other, who works for the same employer, has done
so—is neither supported by the plain language of Title VII nor necessary to protect third parties, such
as spouses or significant others, from retaliation.”); see also Alex B. Long, The Troublemaker’s Friend:
Retaliation Against Third Parties and the Right of Association in the Workplace, 59 Fla. L. Rev. 931,
949–50 (2007) (“The statute’s use of the word ‘he’ clearly seems to indicate that the person
complaining of unlawful retaliation also must have been the person participating in the protected
activity.” (internal citation omitted)).
4. Fogelman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 568 (3d Cir. 2002) (refusing to allow a thirdparty retaliation claim under comparable retaliation provisions within the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the state antidiscrimination law). But see
EEOC v. Nalbandian Sales, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1209–11 (E.D. Cal. 1998) (characterizing as
“ambiguous” whether Title VII’s retaliation provision covers third-party retaliation).
5. See, e.g., EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1246 (D.N.M. 2008); see also
Fogelman, 283 F.3d at 568–69.
6. See Fogelman, 283 F.3d at 564 (“Although we recognize that allowing an employer to retaliate
against a third party with impunity can interfere with the overall purpose of the anti-discrimination
laws, we believe that by referencing to ‘such individual,’ the plain text of these statutes clearly
prohibits only retaliation against the actual person who engaged in protected activity.”); see also
Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 567 F.3d 804, 816 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[The court] must look to what
Congress actually enacted, not what [it] believe[s] Congress might have passed were it confronted with
the facts at bar.”); EEOC v. Bojangles Rest., Inc., 284 F. Supp. 2d 320, 327 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (“It is
entirely possible that Congress could have written the statute as it did to eliminate frivolous suits by
friends, relatives, or acquaintances of persons who do fall within the language of the statute.” (internal
citation omitted)).
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this issue held that third-party retaliation claims fell outside the scope of
7
Title VII’s prohibitions.
In January 2010, the Supreme Court finally had the opportunity to
express its view regarding the viability and scope of the third-party
retaliation doctrine. In Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, the
Court contradicted the federal appellate courts and unanimously held
that Title VII prohibits employers from engaging in third-party
8
retaliation. In many respects, Thompson represented a rather
straightforward example of alleged third-party retaliation by an
employer. The case arose when Eric Thompson, who, along with his
then-fiancé, Miriam Regalado, worked for the defendant North
American Stainless, LP (“North American”), was terminated shortly
9
after Regalado filed a discrimination charge against North American.
Thompson subsequently sued North American, claiming that the
company had terminated him in retaliation for Regalado’s protected
10
activity. Notably, the sole basis for Thompson’s retaliation claim was
Regalado’s discrimination claim: Nowhere in his complaint did
Thompson allege that he personally had engaged in any protected
activity, such as assisting Regalado in filing her discrimination charge or
11
otherwise opposing North American’s alleged treatment of Regalado.
Instead, Thompson explicitly alleged that his “relationship to Miriam
12
[Regalado] was the sole motivating factor in his termination.”
The district court granted summary judgment to North American,
13
holding that Title VII did not permit third-party retaliation claims. The
14
Sixth Circuit ultimately agreed with this view, and Thompson appealed

7. See Thompson, 567 F.3d at 811 (“In sum, no circuit court of appeals has held that Title VII
creates a claim for third-party retaliation in circumstances where the plaintiff has not engaged
personally in any protected activity.”); see also Lawrence L. Lee & Brandon D. Saxon, The Supreme
Court’s 2010 Upcoming Employment Law Docket, 51 Mun. Law. Mag., Sept./Oct. 2010, at 24, 26.
While the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals seemed to permit consideration of a third-party retaliation
claim in EEOC v. Ohio Edison Co., 7 F.3d 541 (6th Cir.1993), it subsequently characterized as dicta
the relevant portion of that decision and distinguished the facts of that case from those involved in a
true third-party retaliation situation. Thompson, 567 F.3d at 809.
8. 131 S. Ct. 863, 868 (2011).
9. Thompson, 567 F.3d at 806.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 807.
12. Id. at 808 (emphasis removed); see also id. (observing that Thompson’s “Statement of the
Issue” and “Statement of Facts” on appeal made clear that Thompson’s retaliation claim was based
upon his fiancée’s protected activity, as opposed to any activity in which he himself had engaged).
13. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 435 F. Supp. 2d 633, 638 (E.D. Ky. 2006).
14. Thompson, 567 F.3d at 805. While a three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit initially reversed
the district court, holding that Thompson could pursue his claim against North American, see
Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 520 F.3d 644, 644 (6th Cir. 2007), the full Sixth Circuit, hearing the
case en banc, ultimately reached the opposite conclusion, determining that only those individuals who
personally engage in protected activity can assert retaliation claims under Title VII. Thompson, 567
F.3d at 805–06.
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to the Supreme Court. Upon its consideration of Thompson’s claim, the
Court adopted a distinctly different view than that ultimately adhered to
by the lower courts here, finding that Thompson could allege a third15
party retaliation claim based upon Regalado’s protected activity.
In its opinion, the Court relied in large part on its previous decision
in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, in which it had
expanded its view of what would constitute an “adverse action” for
16
purposes of Title VII. In any retaliation case, the plaintiff must establish
(i) that he or she engaged in some “protected activity” for Title VII
purposes, either under the statute’s “participation” or “opposition”
framework, (ii) that he or she suffered some adverse employment action,
and (iii) that there is some causal connection between the protected
17
activity and the adverse action. In Burlington Northern, the Court
focused on the “adverse action” prong, holding that actionable
retaliation under Title VII was not limited to employment-related
18
activities or to those affecting the terms and conditions of employment.
Rather, according to the Court, Title VII’s retaliation provision would
bar those retaliatory actions that “a reasonable employee would . . . [find]
materially adverse,” meaning that conduct which “might . . . dissuade[] a
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
19
discrimination.” Applying this analysis to Thompson’s claim, the Court
implied that it might find unlawful retaliation whenever an employer
engages in conduct that reasonably might change an employee’s mind
about engaging in protected activity—regardless of whether that
employer’s conduct was directed at the employee who would have
20
engaged in protected activity or at their coworker.
Thus, the Court made clear in the Thompson decision that Title VII
does prohibit more than just direct retaliation by an employer, but also
indirect, third-party retaliation. Yet while the Court acknowledged the
basic viability of the third-party retaliation doctrine, it failed to establish
any meaningful boundaries with respect to the scope of this doctrine.
Thompson makes clear that an employer cannot retaliate against the
fiancé of an employee who engages in protected activity, but what about
protection for those with more distant relationships, such as the
girlfriend, distant cousin, or lunchroom buddy of the employee who has
engaged in protected activity? If one employee participates in a
discrimination investigation at work and the employer takes adverse

15. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 869–70 (2011).
16. 548 U.S. 53, 67–68 (2006).
17. Fogelman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 567–68 (3d Cir. 2002); Little v. Windermere
Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958, 969 (9th Cir. 2002).
18. 548 U.S. at 67–68.
19. Id. at 68.
20. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 868.
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action against one of these more distantly related employees, does Title
VII provide a federal cause of action? What are the limits of this thirdparty retaliation doctrine?
In Thompson, the Court expressly declined to establish such
contours by “identify[ing] a fixed class of relationships for which thirdparty reprisals are unlawful” and noted that lower courts should examine
the “particular circumstances” in any given case to determine whether to
21
recognize a claim of third-party retaliation. In this respect, the Court
left it almost entirely to the lower courts to determine which types of
relationships will or will not support a third-party retaliation claim.
While such open-endedness undoubtedly provides the courts with
greater flexibility to address each case of alleged third-party retaliation in
its particular facts, this lack of more specific guidance by the Supreme
Court not only might lead to a lack of uniformity in how various
jurisdictions apply the third-party retaliation doctrine, but also might
lead to tremendous uncertainty among both employers and employees
22
regarding the extent of the protections provided by Title VII.
In addition to recognizing the viability of third-party retaliation
claims in Thompson, the Court addressed an additional issue regarding
the practical operation of the third-party retaliation doctrine: which
individual within a workplace relationship should be permitted to bring a
third-party retaliation claim. Should these claims be brought by the
individual who engaged in the protected activity but did not personally
suffer any adverse action? Should these claims be brought by the
individuals who received adverse action, even though these individuals
did not engage in protected activity? Or should either party be permitted
to sue?
By its terms, Title VII permits a person “claiming to be aggrieved”
23
to bring a civil action. North American argued that this provision
should be interpreted to allow only the employee who engaged in
24
protected activity (in this case, Regalado) to sue. The Court, however,
rejected this view, drawing upon a body of administrative law to
conclude that a “person aggrieved” for purposes of Title VII would be
25
anyone within the statute’s “zone of interests.” Under this zone of
interests analysis, the Court would permit a plaintiff to sue so long as the
interests she sought to protect in the suit were sufficiently related to the

21. Id.
22. For a more detailed discussion of the implications of the Court’s failure to provide greater
detail regarding the scope of the third-party retaliation doctrine, see Jessica Fink, Protected by
Association? The Supreme Court’s Incomplete Approach to Defining the Scope of the Third-Party
Retaliation Doctrine, 63 Hastings L.J. (forthcoming January 2012).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2006 & Supp. 2009).
24. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 869–70.
25. Id. at 870.
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purposes of Title VII—regardless of whether she personally engaged in
26
protected activity. Accordingly, employers might face third-party
retaliation claims either from an individual who engaged in protected
activity and who claims that a colleague subsequently received adverse
action as a result, or from an individual who claims to have been fired or
demoted or otherwise harmed due to the protected activity of a
coworker.
***
Thompson’s ramifications remain to be seen. One likely result of
this decision will be an increase in the number of third-party retaliation
claims asserted against employers. For several years, retaliation claims
27
generally have been on the rise. Retaliation claims currently make up
more than one-third of all charges filed with the Equal Employment
28
Opportunity Commission, and this increase shows no signs of abating.
While it is unclear what percentage of these retaliation charges involves
claims of third-party retaliation (as opposed to traditional, direct
retaliation), the Court’s decision in Thompson undoubtedly opens the
door to an increase in this particular type of retaliation claim. Indeed,
with the Court not only recognizing third-party retaliation claims but also
leaving the doctrine’s contours fairly undefined, employees and those
who represent them likely will avail themselves of this evolving cause of
action whenever faced with plausible factual circumstances.
Without a doubt, expanding the protection available to employees
against employer retaliation will provide a new source of relief for
employees who experience indirect employer retaliation. Yet this
increase in protection is not without costs. Given the Court’s direction
that the viability of any particular third-party retaliation claim must
29
“depend upon the particular circumstances” of that case, these cases—
even those involving fairly attenuated claims—will largely turn on their
facts: The courts will have to scrutinize the facts of any allegation of
third-party retaliation to determine, among other things, whether the
relationship between the party who engaged in protected activity and the
party who received adverse action is sufficient to support a third-party
retaliation claim. Accordingly, with the facts playing such a key role,
these third-party retaliation cases rarely will be resolved prior to
summary judgment. Instead, the parties invariably will have to engage in

26. Id. (“We have described the zone of interests test as denying a right of review if the plaintiff’s
interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it
cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.” (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted)).
27. See Charge Statistics: FY 1997 Through FY 2010, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Commission,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited September 30, 2011).
28. See id.; see also Long, supra note 3, at 935.
29. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 868 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
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expensive and time-consuming litigation in order to reach a conclusion in
30
these cases. Thus, even if successful third-party retaliation claims
comprise a small minority of courts’ dockets going forward, employers
may be forced to expend vast resources fending off meritless claims of
this nature, simply because the Court declined to more clearly define the
scope of this doctrine. Whether the benefits of the Court recognizing the
third-party retaliation doctrine in Thompson outweighs these potential
costs remains to be seen.

30. According to one recent study, it costs, on average, over $120,000 to defend against a
wrongful discharge claim, not including any costs of settling the claim or any judgment that a
defendant may ultimately have to pay. See Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863
(2011) (No. 09-291), 2010 WL 4339890 at *1–2; see also Jessica Fink, Unintended Consequences: How
Antidiscrimination Litigation Increases Group Bias in Employer-Defendants, 38 N.M. L. Rev. 333, 340
(2008) (“Some estimate that an employer may spend close to $100,000 to defend against an individual
claim of discrimination, and more than $460,000 to defend against a discrimination class action.”).

